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COLONIZING THE LAST FRONTIER
David J Bloch*
Three degrees of latitude reverses the whole ofjurisprudence.
- Blaise Pascal
In recent years, federal Indian law has seen the emergence of a new
colonial program. Originating not in Congress, the traditional seat of
plenary power over the Indian nations,' but in a judiciary willing to
disregard the legislative mandate to which it once deferred, this program has
altered the political relationship between the United States and Indian
nations largely in existence since 1789.
The sovereignty of Native American tribes, articulated in early
nineteenth-century precedents and usually respected by Supreme Courts
prior to the present one, has been eroded in favor of a jurisprudence
unfamiliar to Indian law, which curiously coincides "with a majority of the
Justices' attitudes about federalism, minority rights, and protection of
mainstream values."2 Since 1978, and especially after Rehnquist became its
Chief Justice, the Court has diminished the inherent powers tribes possessed
as domestic dependent nations and transferred them to the states at the
federal government's expense but without its consent, indeed to the contrary
of congressional and executive policy favoring tribal self-determination.'
* Frank Knox Memorial Fellow in Law, 2003-04, Harvard University. A.B., Amherst
College; M.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., Harvard Law School. My sincere thanks to Frank
Michelman, Mark Hickford, Joseph Singer, and Robert Williams, Jr. for their insightful
comments and suggestions.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Indian Commerce Clause), art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Treaty
Clause), art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (Property Clause), art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause); United States
v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946); Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73,83-84 (1977); seealso Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant lndian Commerce Clause,
27 CoNN. L. REv. 1055, 1059-63 (1995).
2. David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit ofStates'Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REv. 267, 267 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Role ofJurisdiction in the Questfor Sovereignty:
Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV.
641, 644 (2003). On the pre-Rehnquist era, see CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS,
TIME, AND THE LAW 46-52 (1987); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(holding that tribes lack jurisdiction to try and punish non-Indian criminal defendants who
commit crimes on the reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that
tribes may not regulate non-members' fishing and hunting on reservation land owned by non-
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At the same time the Court has brought to bear a judicial methodology
alien to Indian law, for many of these cases have been characterized by a
confused common law mode of legal reasoning unsuited to what was the
constitutional provenance of Indian claims, in which the political powers of
a tribe were determined by congressional fiat and, in case of legislative
ambiguity, a presumption of survival.4 This shift in interpretative procedure
has come at the expense of once honored canons of construction that had
Indians except in limited circumstances); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that tribes may not zone non-member land in non-
Indian communities on a reservation); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that Indian
tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians); Department of Taxation & Finance
v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994) (upholding New York law requiring tribal record
keeping of cigarette sales to non-Indians); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)
(holding that tribes lack civil jurisdiction over non-members on most roads within reservations);
Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (holding that tribes lack
jurisdiction over hundreds of native villages even where there is virtually no federal policing
or regulation); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (holding that state officials are immune
to tribal jurisdiction even when they tortiously invade a member's home on tribal land);
Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, Jr., 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding that non-Indian hotel
guests may not be taxed for staying in a hotel on a reservation on non-Indian land). By way of
contrast, see McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (denying state
jurisdiction to tax income earned by an Indian on the reservation in a bank); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1977) (insulating tribes from double jeopardy defense when prosecuting
defendant for the same offense for which the federal government did); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (permitting tribes to place more onerous membership
requirements on children of female members who marry extramurally than on children of male
members who do so); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (upholding tribal
taxes on non-tribal oil development on reservation); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,
462 U.S. 324 (1983) (allowing tribes to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on reservations
to the exclusion of state regulation); United States v. Lara, No. 03-107 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2004)
(holding that when Congress lifts restrictions on a tribe's criminal jurisdiction over nonmember
Indians, a tribe acts in its sovereign capacity when it prosecutes nonmember Indians and the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit federal prosecution for a federal offense).
4. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1 (1999); Frank
Pommersheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge of the Prairie, 31
ARIz. ST. L.J. 439, 439 (1999); Yuanchung Lee, Rediscovering the Constitutional Lineage of
Federal Indian Law, 27 N.M. L. REV. 273, 275 (1997); Philip P. Frickey, Commentary:
Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1754 (1997); Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law:
Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, 360 (1997);
Curtis G. Berkey, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Bring New Confusion to the Law of Indian
Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW passim (Natl Lawyers Guild Comm. on Native Am.
Indian Struggles ed., 1982).
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been devised to protect Indian nations from the casual extinguishment of
their rights and sovereignty by Leviathan's awesome power in respect of
them.' The effect of this alteration is not a hermeneutic trifle: it has rather
diminished the legal distinctiveness of aboriginal peoples as unique
constituents in the constitutional order created by the Framers and at the
same time made their claims more like any other minority's in America. By
removing Indian law from the unique juridical space it has occupied as a
matter of legal doctrine, history, and political determination, the Court has
created a state of affairs pernicious to the vitality of Indian nations insofar
as it perpetuates the colonial evil of assimilation in the name of color-blind
liberalism.6
In this era of judicial divestiture of tribal sovereignty, another case has
emerged that strikes at the heart of federal Indian law and betrays the primal
compromise in our nation's colonization. Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler
Diane Marie, Inc. (Eyak) repudiates the underlying principle of federal
Indian law - that the federal government's sovereignty is subject to a tribe's
right of occupancy of land to which it holds aboriginal title and that such
title survives unless Congress extinguishes it clearly - in favor of a view
of aboriginal title never before countenanced in the United States and long
discredited in common law jurisdictions which once entertained it - that
pre-existing rights will be deemed extinguished by the mere assertion of
sovereignty over the area to which they pertain until their formal recognition
by an act of state.7 Indeed, an author of a recent article even referred to Eyak
5. See Frickey, supra note 4, at 27, 58.
6. See, e.g., Carole Goldberg, American Indians and "Preferential" Treatment, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 943 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381,424-25
(1993); Milner S. Ball, Legal Storytelling: Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2280, 2296-2318 (1989); cf. JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 131-32 (1995); Will Kymlicka, American
Multiculturalism and the "Nations Within ", in POLITICAL THEORY AND THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 216-36 (Duncan Ivison et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter POLITICAL
THEORY]; WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTSpassim(1995)[hereinafterMULTICULTURALCITIZENSHIP]. In Multicultural Citizenship,
perhaps the single most important contemporary work on Rawlsian liberalism and diversity,
Kymlicka argues that recognizing group rights based on ethnic criteria is essential to achieving
the equal liberty for individuals that classical liberals prize. Id. at 126. He also makes a case
for distinguishing between the special rights of"national minorities" (such as Native Americans,
Maori, etc.) and the special rights of ethnic groups (like immigrant populations). Id. at 10.
7. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999). As will be seen, aboriginal title
No. 1]
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as a "modem version of the aboriginal title doctrine," either in
misapprehension of aboriginal title itself or with ominous perspicacity of
recent developments.8
This Article analyzes Eyak, in which the claims of several native Alaskan
villages to aboriginal title to the seabed were deemed to be legally
inconsistent with federal sovereignty. In Part I it considers the background
to the case and the circumstances which led the villages to commence it. In
Part 11 the Article discusses the nature of common law aboriginal title in the
has been presumed to survive the sovereign succession of the United States to territory formerly
controlled by Indian nations. See infra note 56. In the British Commonwealth, two lines of
cases came to be, one following the traditional American approach to aboriginal title, the other
holding that the customary rights of non-European peoples would only be vindicated following
their formal recognition by the dominant sovereign. See, e.g., The Queen v. Symonds [1847]
N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (P.C.) (the former); Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Sec'y of State for India, 51 I.A.
357 (P.C. 1924) (the latter). See also KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 165-92
(1989); BRIAN SLATrERY, ANCESTRAL LANDS, ALIEN LAWS: JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
ABORIGINAL TITLE 8-9 (1983). The latter tradition was repudiated in Canada in Calder v.
Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.); in Australia in Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.); in South Africa in Alexhor Ltd. and
Government of South Africa v. Richtersveld Cmty. 2003 (12) B.C.L.R. 1301 (CC); and, to the
extent it had purchase in New Zealand, in Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, [1901] App. Cas. 561
(P.C.) (appeal taken from N.Z.) and Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer [ 1986] 1 N.Z.L.R.
680. Aside from common law tradition, indigenous peoples' right to land has been recognized
as a matter of international law. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12
(Oct. 16) (advising that the Western Sahara at the time of Spanish colonization was not terra
nullius); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 27, G.A. Res.
2200(XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (providing that ethnic,
religious, or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their
own language); Lansmann v. Finland, Comm. No. 671/1995, CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995, 2.1-
2.4, 10.1-10.5 (holding that Sami reindeer herding on certain land is protected by article 27,
despite that land's disputed ownership); Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada,
Comm. No. 167/1984, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. A/45/40, vol. II, annex IX.A, 32.2
(holding that economic and social activities linked with territory are a part of culture protected
by article 27); Ansmann et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/ 511/1992 (1994) (holding that reindeer herding is a part of Sami culture
protected by article 27); Kitokv. Sweden, Comm. No. 197/1985, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N.
Doc. A/43/40, annex VII.G (1988) (holding that article 27 extends to economic activity where
that activity is an essential element in the culture of an ethnic community); see also U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 23 (50) (Art. 27), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 38,
adopted Apr. 6, 1994; Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1751 (2003).
8. See John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The United Tribe of Shawnee Indians: Battle for
Recognition, 69 UMKC L. REV. 311,319 n.45 (2000).
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United States. In Part III it interrogates the judiciary's application of the
"federal paramountcy doctrine" in a manner which extinguished the villages'
exclusive title in contradiction of congressional pronouncements otherwise.
In the light of this inquiry the Article argues in Part IV that the judiciary
misapplied the doctrine by mistaking the nature of aboriginal title,
deliberately disregarding precedent to this end, and refusing to employ
properly the test for extinguishment of aboriginal title. The Article then
posits that the Ninth Circuit vitiated the Constitution, whose separation of
powers has always been understood to allocate plenary power over Indian
nations to Congress, and consequently made a legislative decision to deploy
a new colonial regime over the last frontier, the ocean. Part V probes the
related issue of the survival of exclusive aboriginal rights in the territorial
sea in the absence of a treaty or statute, which the Circuit incorrectly said in
dicta could not exist. Finally, the Article concludes in Part VI with
recommendations: it argues that Eyak be overturned as a doctrinally
incorrect and politically indefensible intrusion into congressional
prerogative and tribal autonomy; it urges that Congress alternatively fulfill
its fiduciary duty to the villages by using its paramount powers to grant a
title commensurate to their claim or providing compensation for the taking
of their right of occupation.
L Prior History of Eyak: The Villages'Appeal
Halibut. Black cod. Gray cod. Scallops. Red salmon. King salmon.
Chum salmon. Silver salmon. Dungeness. Bairdi crab. Razor clams.
Octopus. For more than 7000 years members of the Indian villages of Eyak,
Tatitlek, Chanenga, Port Graham, and Nanwalek have subsisted on and
sanctified such fruits of the sea. These federally recognized tribes are
located on the Prince William Sound, the Gulf of Alaska, and the lower
Cook Inlet regions of Alaska.9 Throughout their history, the villages have
depended on the resources of the coastal waters.' Indeed, their very
occupancy of the shore and immemorial enjoyment of sea and seabed are
testament to the variety and bounty of marine mammals, fish, and sea birds
in that area. These resources ensured a more certain livelihood than the
9. See 51 Fed. Reg. 25,115 (July 10, 1986). More specifically, Eyak (near Cordova),
Tatitlek (on the mainland just south of Valdez Arm), and Chenega (in Chenega Bay on Evans
Island) are located in the Prince William Sound. Port Graham and Nanwalek occupy the
southwestern tip of the Kenai Peninsula, south of Katchemak Bay in lower Cook Inlet.
10. See, e.g., Donald W. Clark, Prehistory of the Pacific Eskimo Region, in SMITHSONIAN
INSTITUTION HANDBOOKOFNORTH AMERICAN INDIANS (ARCTIC) 136 (David Damas ed., 1984).
No. 1]
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inland hunt of moose and caribou could provide. The villages formed at the
water's edge.
Historically, whales were prized by the tribal members for their blubber,
meat, and oil. Sea lions, porpoises, smaller whales, and seals would be
harpooned in open water from skin-covered kayaks. Seal hunting
additionally required the use of decoys, nets, and ambuscade. The furs of
sea otters were highly valued. Bottom fish like cod, halibut, and rockfish,
harvested from deep water with baited hooks and lures, were a staple of
subsistence commensurate to the mammals. As travel between the villages
was frequent and typically by water (in umiaks" as well as kayaks),
extensive trade and ceremonial exchange of the sea's riches developed.
Many cultural traits are consequently shared by otherwise distinct coastal
tribes. In all cases, the traditions associated with life, love, religion, and
death came to depend on the ocean and its resources.
A majority of village members today continue the subsistence lifestyle of
their forbears: they pursue a livelihood that relies on the fish and wildlife of
the territorial sea, and their continued social, cultural, and economic well-
being depends on their continued ability to hunt and fish in their traditional
domain. The villages are small and isolated, often unconnected to roads.
The waters of the sea are their blood.
In 1995, the villages brought suit in federal district court against the
Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Trawler Diane
Marie corporation. 2 The villages sought a declaratoryjudgment confirming
their aboriginal title to their traditional fishing grounds in the outer
continental shelf (OCS) in the Gulf of Alaska. 3 Such title would include the
exclusive aboriginal rights to use, occupy, possess, hunt, fish in, and
otherwise exploit the waters and seabed beneath them. The villages also
sought three injunctions: one to prohibit the Secretary of Commerce from
implementing commercial and noncommercial fishing regulations in the area
11. Like the kayak, the umiak is another kind of open Eskimo boat made of a wooden frame
and covered with hide.
12. The district court's final unreported judgment is Native Viii. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane
Marie, Inc., No. CV-95-0063 (D. Alaska Oct. 9, 1997).
13. For purposes of U.S. law, the OCS includes submerged lands lying seaward and outside
of the area of lands beneath navigable waters (as defined in § 1301 of the Submerged Lands
Act), and whose subsoil and seabed connect to the United States and are within its jurisdiction
and control. See Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (2000). The OCS thus includes
submerged lands outside statutorily determined state territorial boundaries, i.e., beyond three
miles, and extends seaward to the limit of federal jurisdiction and control, i.e., to the 200-mile
boundary of the exclusive economic zone.
[Vol. 29
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at issue; another to prevent the Trawler Diane Marie's vessel, "MISTER
BIG," from scallop fishing within the territory (pursuant to the Secretary of
Commerce's license); and a third enjoining the Secretary of the Interior from
conducting an oil and gas lease sale in the lower Cook Inlet. The district
court dismissed the villages' claims against the Secretary of the Interior for
lack of ripeness. By separate order and at the parties' stipulation, the claims
against Trawler Diane Marie were also dismissed. 4 In the end, the villages'
remaining causes, and those which would become the subject of their
subsequent appeal, were directed solely against William Daley, then the
Secretary of Commerce. 5
The villages lost their claims when the district court denied their motion
for summaryjudgment and granted the defendants' on the basis that "federal
paramountcy" (to be discussed in course) precluded, as a matter of law,
aboriginal title to the OCS. The court alternatively held that there could in
any case be no exclusive aboriginal right to fish in navigable waters based
on aboriginal title in the absence of a treaty or federal statute guaranteeing
otherwise (and here the court found no relevant treaty or statute).
When the villages appealed to the Ninth Circuit, they again sought
injunctive and declaratory relief. More specifically, they argued that the
regulations which the Secretary of Commerce made pursuant to the
Magnuson Fishery Conservation Management Act (Magnuson Act) and
Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982 (Halibut Act) improperly authorized
non-tribal members to fish within the villages' exclusive aboriginal
territories even as the regulations prohibited village members from doing so.
Each Act has a complex regulatory scheme. It suffices for our purposes to
note that they charge the Secretary of Commerce with regulating commercial
and noncommercial fishing of halibut and black cod. Commercial fishing
is administered through the issuance of Individual Fishing Quota permits. 6
14. In March 1995, the Department of Commerce issued an emergency order closing
Alaskan federal waters to scallop fishing. See 60 Fed. Reg. 11,054 (Mar. 1, 1995). The villages
consequently withdrew their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction against Trawler Diane Marie.
15. The appeal, to be discussed in course, is Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie,
Inc., 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998).
16. See Magnuson Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (2000) (extending U.S. control and
jurisdiction to waters lying between three and 200 miles off the coast by establishing an
exclusive fishery conservation zone and asserting "sovereign rights and exclusive fishery
management authority over all fish, and all Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the
exclusive economic zone"). Congress also specified that the Magnuson Act "should not be
construed, in any way, to affect or change" the fishing rights of Native Americans, whether
No. 1]
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Although a few village members possess these, the majority of them do.
Moreover, since the Secretary's sport-fishing regulations govern
noncommercial halibut fishing, village members are restricted to harvesting
halibut with a hook and line, the latter having no more than two hooks on it,
and two fish per diem. 7 The regime set in place by the Acts consequently
posed a two-fold threat to the villages' livelihood: not only were non-
members encouraged to exploit traditional native areas at the Secretary's
authorization, but villagers themselves were prevented from doing so in the
absence of the same grant. For this reason the injunctions were sought.
The villages also requested a declaration that they held unextinguished
aboriginal title to the land at issue, i.e., the seabed. Success on this point
would be even more meaningful than winning the injunction. For if the
villages could prove that they held title to the seabed, an explicit
congressional mandate would be necessary (rather than the indirect
implications of generally applicable statutes like the Magnuson and Halibut
Acts) to extinguish the villages' exclusive use of their property."8 Whether
established by "treaty" or "any other applicable decision." S. REP. No. 94-416, at 692 (1975).
For the Halibut Act, see 16 U.S.C. §§ 773-773k (2000), which implements the Convention
Between the United States and Canada for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery in the
Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, Mar. 2, 1953, U.S.-Can., 5 U.S.T. 5. Underthe Halibut
Act, the Northern Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) allocates fishing privileges
among U.S. fishermen; the Secretary then promulgates regulations. The NPFMC's mandate,
however, requires that "such allocation shall be fair and equitable to all such fishermen, based
upon the rights and obligations in existing Federal law .... 16 U.S.C. § 773c(c). Aboriginal
rights protected by federal law are thus left unaffected by the Halibut Act, which must operate
around them.
17. Cf Andrew P. Richards, Note, Aboriginal Title or the Paramountcy Doctrine? Johnson
v. McIntosh Flounders in Federal Waters Off Alaska in Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler
Diane Marie, Inc., 78 WASH. L. REV. 939, 960 (2003).
18. Although an uncertain area of Federal Indian law, generally applicable statutes will
usually not apply to Indian tribes if
(1) the law touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters"; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate rights
guaranteed by Indian treaties"; or (3) there is proof"by legislative history or some
other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their
reservations .... "
Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985), citing United
States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980); see also F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960) (holding that general acts of Congress apply to Indians as well as
to all others in the absence of a clear expression to the contrary). On the other hand, generally
applicable statutes cannot extinguish aboriginal title and rights; for such action, Congressional
intent must be "clear and plain." See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 353
(1941). Tuscarora remains a controversial case. Indeed, the majority's reasoning provoked the
[Vol. 29
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or not the villages held such title to the seabed would need to be litigated on
remand in a district court: this question of fact was not raised in the Ninth
Circuit. The importance of the villages' appeal, therefore, was to win the
critical point of law, namely to overturn the district court's holding that there
could be no aboriginal title to the OCS and that, even were that not the case,
such title could not include an exclusive right to fish in navigable waters
outside of the provision of a treaty or federal statute.
II. Common Law Aboriginal Title
Before we review the Ninth Circuit's decision we should generally
consider the nature of the villages' claim. This Part will outline the
implications of what it meant for the villages to claim "aboriginal title" to
the OCS.
In the American scheme, Indians are the native inhabitants of lands
colonized first by European powers and then by the United States; these
inhabitants were recognized long ago, in Chief Justice Marshall's words, as
the "rightful occupants of the soil."19 At the same time, in the United States
their right to self-determination as sovereign nations has been "necessarily
diminished" by the juristic doctrine of "discovery. 20  The factitious
imprimatur of discovery permitted European potentates to assert in
strident dissent of Justice Black that ends with one of the most frequently quoted statements in
Indian law: "Great nations, like great men, should keep their word." Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at
142.
19. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
20. Id. The particular diminishments Marshall had in mind were the tribes' inability to
alienate their lands to parties other than the federal government and to treat with nations other
than the United States. The Chief Justice would later explain in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
that Indians tribes are "domestic dependent nations" possessed of their own limited sovereignty,
but in a state of"pupilage" to the United States. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1, 17 (1831). He then clarified in Worcester v. Georgia that "[t]he Indian nations had always
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception
of that imposed by irresistible power .... " Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559
(1832). Chief Justice Marshall also analogized the Indians' status to that of Vatelian "tributary"
or "feudal" states in Europe in his comment that a "weak state, in order to provide for its safety,
may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right
of government, and ceasing to be a state." Id. at 561; see also WILKINSON, supra note 3, at 53-
86. For an earlier characterization of Indians as a "feudatory people," see R. v. Phelps, [ 1823]
1 Taylor 47, 52-53, where the Upper Canada King's Bench heard arguments to this effect by
Robert Baldwin, the distinguished lawyer who would one day be Attorney-General for Canada
West and a prime minister of the country.
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themselves and recognize in their peers an underlying title to the discovered
land.2' To be sure, the "extravagant" claim of discovery, as Marshall had it,
was only plausible within the parameters of a self-consciously racist system,
one which used the "character and religion" of indigenous inhabitants as "an
apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of
Europe might claim an ascendancy. 22 The radical title gained by this legal
fiction allowed a European sovereign the sole privilege of appropriating the
lands occupied by indigenous peoples in the area of his discovery.3 His was
an exclusive right of preemption as against all others to acquire the
possessory rights of the native people by conquest or cession, but was not
in itself aplenum dominium.24 So the indigenous peoples' pre-existing rights
were thus retained by virtue of their immemorial use and occupancy of the
land at issue - discovery as such did not extinguish them 25 - and they
acted as a burden on the sovereign's naked fee and were held to be
21. See MCNEIL, supra note 7, at 245. On the intellectual, theological, and ideological
origins of the doctrine of discovery, see RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE:
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 78-108 (1999);
DAVID GETCHES, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 41-72 (4th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter FEDERAL INDIAN LAW]; JAMES TULLY, AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
LOCKE IN CONTEXTS 137-75 (1993); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal
Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983); ANTHONY PAGDEN, THE FALL OF NATURAL MAN: THE
AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE ORIGINS OF COMPARATIVE ETHNOLOGY (1982); JAMES MULDOON,
POPES, LAWYERS, AND INFIDELS: THE CHURCH AND THE NON-CHRISTIAN WORLD, 1250-1550
(1979).
22. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573.
23. One is reminded of Paul Auster's observation, made in an altogether different context,
that "[n]o one wants to be part of a fiction, and even less so if that fiction is real." PAUL
AUSTER, THE NEW YORK TRILOGY 225 (1986).
24. To the extent that discovery does seem analogous to settlement, the confiscations it
allowed should have amounted to acts of state against a subject. MCNEIL, supra note 7, at 246.
In response to this consideration, Marshall let pragmatism rule and deemed the fact of
colonization non-justiciable:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited
country into conquest may appear, if the principle has been asserted in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under
it; if the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes
the law of the land, and cannot be questioned.
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591.
25. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572-73; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543-44. But cf Joseph William
Singer, Well Settled? The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28
GA. L. REV. 481, 490 (1994).
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inalienable save to the sovereign himself.26 In this way the federal
government could acquire land cheaply as a monopsonist and control
colonization, since all valid titles had to issue from it rather than a tribe
directly.27 At the same time, the pre-existing natural law property rights of
Indians could be nominally respected.2" It is these possessory rights which
have been called "original title," "Indian title," "native title," and
"aboriginal title."29
As to the nature of the Indians' title, the Marshall court said in its final
Indian law decision that it
was considered with reference to their habits and modes of life;
their hunting-grounds were as much in their actual possession as
the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its exclusive
enjoyment in their own way and for their own purposes were as
26. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
27. See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh,
19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 111-13 (2001); see also David V. Williams, The Queen v. Symonds
Reconsidered, 19 VUW L. REV. 385, 395-98 (1989) (making a similar point about Symonds,
New Zealand's 1847 analogue to Johnson) and Mark Hickford, "Settling Some Very Important
Principles of ColonialLaw": Three "Forgotten "Cases of the 1840s, 35 VUW L. REV. 1 (2004)
(discussing historical use of Johnson in New Zealand).
28. Alexis de Tocqueville famously articulated this exquisite hypocrisy soon after Johnson's
holding:
The conduct of the Americans of the United States towards the
natives . . .breathes the purest love of forms and legality. Provided that the
Indians stay in the savage state, the Americans do not mix at all in their affairs and
treat them as independent peoples; they do not permit themselves to occupy their
lands without having duly acquired them by means of a contract; and if by chance
an Indian nation can no longer live on its territory, they take it like a brother by
the hand and lead it to die outside the country of its fathers. The Spanish, with the
help of unexampled monstrous deeds, covering themselves with an indelible
shame, could not succeed in exterminating the Indian race, nor even prevent it
from sharing their rights; the Americans of the United States have attained this
double result with marvelous facility - tranquilly, legally, philanthropically,
without spilling blood, without violating a single one of the great principles of
morality in the eyes of the world. One cannot destroy men while being more
respectful of the laws of humanity.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 325 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
29. See FELIX COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 486-93 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN, 1982 ED.].
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much respected, until they abandoned them, made a cession to the
government, or an authorized sale to individuals."
In this way, as has famously been said, the Indians' "right of occupancy
[was] considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites,"'" so that, despite
lacking fundamental characteristics of that estate (such as alienability), the
Indian title is nonetheless deemed perpetual (though subject to
abandonment32), exclusive as against third parties (but able to be terminated
by the federal government33), and bestowing full beneficial use of the lands
occupied, including rights to timber and subsurface minerals. 4
The radical or sovereign title held by the United States and the aboriginal
title held collectively by a given native tribe are altogether "separate but
nonexclusive forms of ownership," which can "be held in the same lands at
the same time."3 As the Supreme Court explained in Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida,
It very early became accepted doctrine in this Court that
although fee title to the lands occupied by Indians when the
colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign - first the
discovering European nation and later the original States and the
United States - a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was
nevertheless recognized. That right, sometimes called Indian title
and good against all but the sovereign, could be terminated only
by sovereign act. Once the United States was organized and the
Constitution adopted, these tribal rights to Indian lands became
the exclusive province of the federal law. Indian title, recognized
to be only a right occupancy, was extinguishable only by the
United States.36
30. Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 746; MCNEIL, supra note 7, at 253-54.
31. Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 746.
32. See, e.g., Northwestern Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 339 (1945).
33. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County ofOneida, 414 U.S. 661,667 (1974) (Oneida
34. See, e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 115-17 (1938).
35. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F.2d 935, 941 (Ct.
Cl. 1974); see also Sac & Fox Tribe v. United States, 383 F.2d 991 (Ct. CI. 1967)
(demonstrating that sovereign and Indian title can be held in the same lands at the same time).
For English colonial law, see PAUL G. MCHUGH, THE MAORI MAGNA CARTA: NEW ZEALAND
AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 103 (1991).
36. Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 667.
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Indian tribes retain their aboriginal title unless and until Congress
extinguishes it, which Congress alone may do in its plenary capacity (and
without offering compensation, unless the title is protected by treaty or
statute).37 In this way an exclusive aboriginal title does not and cannot
37. The preemptive rights of purchase recognized in Johnson and the federal trust
relationship over Indian tribes - created by the Indian Commerce Clause and various statutes
since 1790 - grant this authority to Congress alone. See COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 29, at
489. Common law aboriginal title is to be distinguished from aboriginal title guaranteed by
treaty or statute. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (holding that
aboriginal title is not a property interest but a right ofpermissive occupancy which the sovereign
grants and protects against intrusion by third parties but may terminate at any time without being
constitutionally obliged to offer compensation); MCNEIL, supra note 7, at 259-64, 303. In spite
of Tee-Hit-Ton's hateful holding, which may have partly arisen from Justice Reed's particular
conclusion that the Indian land claim "was more a claim of sovereignty than of ownership," id.
at 287, wholly uncompensated takings of Indians' non-proprietary interest in their land remain
the exception in the United States. Rather, most have been compensated for by treaties,
agreements, special legislation allowing individual tribal claims (for example, the post-Tee-Hit-
Ton Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000)), and claims made pursuant
to the Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 70 (2000)). See FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 21, at 275-86. Such outcomes
reflect the preference, made clear in both the majority and minority opinions in the second
Oneida case and Tee-Hit-Ton itself, that a political solution to such takings is preferable to their
judicial resolution, at least in instances of high visibility and importance. See County of Oneida
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (Oneida II) (holding that, even in the absence of
an express congressional preservation of aboriginal rights to vast portions of New York, such
rights are sua sponte preserved under the common law doctrine of sovereign succession unless
and until clearly extinguished by Congress). Moreover, the holding in Tee-Hit-Ton itself is not
so absolute as one might think. While representing the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Indians
in their judicially mediated claims against the State of Maine, Archibald Cox made the
following argument:
Congress has power, under Tee-Hit-Ton, to legislate concerning the property of
Indian tribes but that regulatory power, like all other regulatory powers, must be
exercised in conformity with the Bill of Rights, including the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. An exercise of Congressional Power over Indian affairs
which would simply confiscate the interest of the Indians would violate the
guarantees of fundamental fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause. The
principle that Congress must exercise its power over Indian affairs consistently
with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment lies at the heart of
the... decision in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73
(1977) . . . In that case the court held that the validity of a given legislative
solution involving tribal property rights depends on whether it "can be tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the
Indians .... Citing to Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). The opinion
[also] cites United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks . .. ,329 U.S. 40 (1946)
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conflict with the paramountcy of the federal government. This is the logical
concomitant of what Chief Justice Vinson wrote in United States v. Alcea
Band of Tillamooks: "As against any but the sovereign, original Indian title
was accorded the protection of complete ownership; but it was vulnerable
to affirmative action by the sovereign, which possessed exclusive power to
extinguish the right of occupancy at will."38 Indeed, the Supreme Court held
almost 200 years ago that "the nature of the Indian title.., is not such as to
be... repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the state."39 In the years since
Fletcher and before Eyak, the Court has consistently held that federal
sovereignty and exclusive aboriginal title are wholly compatible.4" It has
moreover recognized aboriginal title every time the United States extended
its jurisdiction into territory occupied by Indians, including Alaska.4 With
these canonical principles in mind, we turn to the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Eyak.
for the proposition that the "power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a
plenary nature; but it is not absolute." 329 U.S. at 54.
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 21, at 351; see also Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S.
445, 478 (1899) (assuming that Congress enjoys "plenary power of legislation" in respect of
tribes but that such power is subject to the Constitution). With respect to Tee-Hit-Ton's holding,
see St. Catherine's Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1888] 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.) (appeal
taken from Can.) and Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada, [ 1921 ] 1
App. Cas. 401 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Can.) (advising that native title is subject to the
Sovereign's good will).
38. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 46 (1946). The naked fee
underlying an aboriginal title is a reversionary interest that becomes possessory once Congress
extinguishes the aboriginal title. See COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 29, at 489.
39. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142-43 (1810); cf NireahaTamaki v. Baker,
1901 App. Cas. 561, 574 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.Z.) (holding that the native title of
possession and occupancy is not inconsistent with the seisin in fee of the Crown and that, by
asserting a claim to native title in a court of the Crown, a claimant acknowledges and relies on
the paramount title of the Crown).
40. Oneida II, 470 U.S. at 233-36 (1985); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111,
116-18 (1938).
41. See, e.g., Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211,244 (1872) (Florida Cession Treaty);
Mitchel et al. v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835) (Florida Cession Treaty); United
States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345-47 (1941) (Mexican Cession Treaty); Tee-
Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279-85 (Alaska Cession Treaty); see also Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan,
369 U.S. 60, 65 (1962) (observing that when Congress passed the Alaska Statehood Act, its
concern was "to preserve the status quo with respect to aboriginal and possessory Indian claims,
so that statehood would neither extinguish them nor recognize them as compensable").
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Il. The Federal Paramountcy Doctrine and State Claims to Fee Simple
Title to the OCS
The Circuit first considered whether the district court erroneously held that
the federal paramountcy doctrine barred the villages' aboriginal title claims to
the OCS as well as any other claims they might make there to exclusive hunting
and fishing rights.
The "federal paramountcy doctrine" was established by four Supreme Court
cases in which the federal government and various coastal states contested
ownership and control of the territorial sea and landward portions of the OCS.
In the first of these cases, United States v. California, the United States sought
an injunction against the execution of certain leases California had contracted
with private companies. a2 The leases authorized the companies to extract
petroleum, gas, and other mineral deposits from the Pacific Ocean. In
California, the principal argument of the United States was that it possessed
"paramount rights" in the lands and "other things of value" subjacent to the
ocean.43 California in turn insisted that the territorial sea, i.e., the area extending
from the low-water mark of the state's coast three miles into the ocean, was
within its boundaries.' As California had it, insofar as the original colonies had
acquired from the English or Dutch Crown a title to all the lands within their
boundaries under navigable waters (including a three-mile appurtenance in
adjacent seas), and because California was admitted into the Union on an "equal
footing" with the original states, it also became vested with title to the seabed
when it became part of the United States.45
The Supreme Court had to decide, then,
whether the state or the Federal Government ha[d] the paramount
right and power to determine in the first instance when, how, and by
what agencies, foreign or domestic, the oil and other resources of the
soil of the marginal sea, known or hereafter discovered, may be
exploited.'
Through a rationale that would prove dispositive in the subsequent
paramountcy cases, the Court rejected California's argument, concluding instead
that the acquisition of the marginal sea, as well as its protection and control, had
42. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
43. Id. at 22.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 23.
46. Id. at 29.
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been and was always a function of "national external sovereignty."'' 7 There was
no meaningful comparison in the Court's view between the "local interests" that
supported a state's control of internal navigable waters and the sources of
sovereignty over any part of the ocean. In sum, the federal government "must
have powers of dominion and regulation in the interest of its revenues, its health,
and the security of its people from wars waged on or too near its coasts."48 So
much could be inferred from international law and the American constitutional
scheme: the former required that matters occurring in the open sea be resolved
by sovereign nations (rather than their constituent units), the latter did not equip
states "with the powers or the facilities for exercising the responsibilities"
attending dominion over the ocean.49 The Court consequently declared that "the
47. Id. at 34.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. Compare the High Court of Australia's holding in the so-called "Seas and
Submerged Lands Case," New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337,479-80
(Austl.). Although the Australian case was constitutional in nature rather than derived from the
law of property, it is worthwhile to note here the different common law English approach to the
foreshore. In English property law, the foreshore and seabed are considered Crown property
by prerogative right (rather than by constitutional provision and judicial construction). See
Matthew Hale, De Jure Maris el Brachiorum Ejusdem, in STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF
THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO 370-413 (1888). See generally GEOFFREY
MARSTON, THE MARGINAL SEABED: UNITED KINGDOM LEGAL PRACTICE (1981). Thus in
contrast to the usual scheme in which the Crown can only possess lands to which its title is a
matter of record, in the case of the foreshore and seabed claimants to these areas must
demonstrate their possession of an actual Crown grant. For an example of how a claim to
exclusive title to the seabed in a navigable waterway can be demonstrated, see Attorney-General
v. Emerson, 1891 App. Cas. 649 (appeal taken from Engl.) (holding that proof of ownership of
a several fishery over part of the foreshore raises a presumption against the Crown that the
freehold of the soil of that part of the foreshore is in the owner of the several fishery). A
plausible aetiology for this rule has been well articulated by Kent McNeil:
A possible explanation lies in the fact that the fiction of grants was invented along
with the fiction of original Crown occupation and ownership to explain the
Crown's paramount lordship over lands that were originally occupied by others.
But the foreshore and sea-bed are different because, except where a pier, retaining
wall, or the like is built, they cannot be occupied in the same way as other lands.
More commonly they are unoccupied, and probably always have been, and are
therefore presumed to have remained in the original occupation of the Crown,
which extends to all waste lands [sc. terrae nullius] that have never been held by
subjects. Furthermore, there are important public rights of navigation and fishing
over tidal and coastal waters that need to be protected. Consequently, the
'ownership of the Crown is for the benefit of the subject'. The existence of these
rights also excludes to a large extent the possibility of exclusive occupation of the
underlying lands. For these reasons, the foreshore and sea-bed are unique, and so
special rules respecting them have been developed that do not apply to other
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Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power
over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil
under that water area, including oil."
In the wake of its success in California, the United States determined to
confirm its title to other seabeds adjacent to coastal states. Three years later, in
United States v. Louisiana, the federal government contended that it held title
to the land beneath the sea extending twenty-seven miles into the Gulf of
Mexico. ° To the contrary, Louisiana argued that before and since the time of
its admission into the Union, it had exercised control over the area in question
and had even statutorily included the twenty-seven-mile marginal sea within its
state territory. As might have been expected, the Supreme Court disagreed:
California, the Court's own ipse dixit, was controlling:
Protection and control of the area are indeed functions of national
external sovereignty. The marginal sea is a national, not a state
concern. National interests, national responsibilities, national
concerns are involved. The problems of commerce, national
defense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus there.
National rights must therefore be paramount in that area.51
To be sure, the only difference between Louisiana's and California's
arguments was one of degree, i.e., that the former state claimed twenty-four
miles more than the latter, a point which could hardly have militated in
Louisiana's favor.
If... the three-mile belt is in the domain of the Nation rather than
that of the separate States, it follows a fortiori that the ocean beyond
that limit also is .... Certainly it is not less so. So far as the issues
presented here are concerned, Louisiana's enlargement of her
boundary emphasizes the strength of the claim of the United States
to this part of the ocean and the resources of the soil under that area,
including oil.52
In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court again confirmed the federal
government's paramount interests in the seabed.53 Like Louisiana, Texas had by
lands.
MCNEIL,supra note 7, at 103-05 (internal citations omitted). See also MARSTON, supra at 270-
85 for the historical and juridical bases of the Crown's claim to the marginal solum.
50. 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
51. Id. at 704.
52. Id. at 705-06.
53. 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Louisiana and Texas were brought by the United States as
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statute extended its boundary twenty-four miles beyond the three-mile limit.
The state subsequently enlarged its territory even more, however: it passed
another law declaring its territory to reach to the outer edge of the continental
shelf, i.e., to 200 miles from its shores. 4 Texas's argument differed from the one
Louisiana and California propounded. More subtle and refined, its contention
was that (1) as a separate republic prior to its entry into the United States, Texas
enjoyedplenum of title (both dominium and imperium) over the lands, minerals,
and other fruits which underlay the marginal sea, and that (2) on entering the
Union, Texas conveyed to the federal government its powers of imperium, i.e.,
its sovereignty, over the marginal sea, but reserved its dominiumf5
Those acquainted with Indian claims to title and rights will find Texas's
gossamer reasoning familiar. In fact, far from being inventive or fanciful,
Texas's argument arises from the doctrine of continuity, a commonplace tenet
of sovereign succession under international and common law, which has been
frequently expressed and affirmed in the judicial resolution of native claims in
America and the Commonwealth: upon a sovereign's conquest or acquisition of
a new territory, imperium over that region passed to the new sovereign, but the
underlying dominium, whether usufructuary in nature or in fee simple, was left
unaffected. 56 Although willing to find such a principle controlling in other
companion cases.
54. Id. at 720.
55. Id. at 712-13.
56. See, e.g., Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Worcester:
The king purchased [the Indians'] lands when they were willing to sell, at a price
they were willing to take; but never coerced a surrender of them. He also
purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into the
interior of their affairs, or interfered with their selq-]government, so far as
respected themselves only.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 547; see also Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 748-49
(1835) (holding that an established principle of international law requires that the laws of a
conquered or ceded country remain in force until altered by the new sovereign and that the
inhabitants of the conquered country also retain all rights not taken from them by the new
sovereign in right of conquest, cession, or by new laws); cf Viscount Haldane's Privy Council
advice in Amodu Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (Secretary), [1921] 2 App. Cas. 399, 407 (P.C.)
(appeal taken from S. Nig.) ("mere change in sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to
disturb fights of private owners"); Viscount Sumner's in Bakare Ajakaiye v. Southern Provinces
(Lieutenant-Governor), 1929 App. Cas. 679 (P.C.) (appeal taken from S. Nig.). See also the
High Court of Australia's rulings in Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 54-57
(Austl.), and Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 183 C.L.R. 373,422-23 (Austl.) ("at
common law, a mere change in sovereignty does not extinguish pre-existing rights and interests
in land in that territory"), and the concurrence of Justice Binnie of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Minister of National Revenue Appellant v. Grand Chief Michael Mitchell and Attorney-
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contexts, the Supreme Court had little patience for it in the instant case.57
"When Texas came into the Union, she ceased to be an independent
nation.... The United States then took her place as respects foreign commerce,
the waging of war, the making of treaties, defense of the shores, and the like."58
When it conveyed its sovereignty, any "claim that Texas may have had to the
marginal sea was relinquished to the United States." 9 The Court rejected the
contention that "the sovereignty of the sea can be complete and unimpaired no
matter if Texas owns the oil underlying it."'6 "Once low-water mark is passed
the international domain is reached," and from that point "property rights
must... be so subordinated to political rights as in substance to coalesce and
unite in the national sovereign., 6' The Court then pronounced both doctrine and
oracle:
Today the controversy is over oil. Tomorrow it may be over some
other substance or mineral or perhaps the bed of the ocean itself. If
the property, whatever it may be, lies seaward of the low-water mark,
its use, disposition, management, and control involve national
interests and national responsibilities.62
Twenty-five years after Texas, the United States brought an action against the
original thirteen Atlantic coastal states. In this last of the paramountcy cases,
United States v. Maine, the United States argued that it was entitled to exclusive
exercise of its sovereign entitlement to dominium and imperium over the seabed
beneath the Atlantic Ocean in order to explore and exploit the area and its
natural resources. 63 The area at issue extended from the mean low-water mark
and outer limit of inland coastal waters seaward to the OCS, i.e., to the limit of
the exclusive economic zone. With the exception of Florida, the coastal states
claimed that, as successors in title to certain grantees of the Crowns of England
and Holland, they were entitled to exclusive dominium and imperium over the
General of Quebec, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (Can.) ("As with the modem law of aboriginal rights,
the law of sovereign succession was intended to reconcile the interests of the local inhabitants
across the empire to a change in sovereignty."); MCNEIL, supra note 7, at 162-79.
57. The Court acknowledged that while "dominion and imperium are normally separable
and separate," in the case of the OCS "property interests are so subordinated to the rights of
sovereignty as to follow sovereignty." Texas, 339 U.S. at 719.
58. 1d. at 717-18.
59. Id. at 718.
60. Id. at 719.
61. Id.
62. Id. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
63. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 516-17 (1975).
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seabed underlying the Atlantic from the coastline to the limit of U.S.
jurisdiction.64 This argument rested on the same principles of sovereign
succession as Texas's argument in its eponymous case. In Maine, however, the
appellees additionally contended, presumably in the light of the Tenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, that "they acquired dominion over the
offshore seabed prior to the adoption of the Constitution and at no time
relinquished it to the United States. 65
The coastal states urged the Supreme Court to re-examine its decisions in
California, Louisiana, and Texas. Acceding to the states' request, the Court
nevertheless found these cases to rest on firm constitutional ground:
[As a matter of] purely legal principle . . . the Constitu-
tion... allotted to the federal government jurisdiction over foreign
commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense and . . . it
necessarily follows, as a matter of constitutional law, that as
attributes of these external sovereign powers the federal government
has paramount rights in the marginal sea.66
The Court therefore found that the existence of the thirteen original states
prior to the formation of the Union was of no constitutional significance in the
instant case.67 Put differently, one of the basic structural principles of the
Constitution, federalism, required that certain powers granted by the states to the
federal government include as their incident exclusive national sovereignty over
the OCS.
The Court did not formulate its decision in Maine solely in constitutional
terms, however. It also stated that Congress had legitimately confirmed federal
paramountcy over the seabed when it passed the Submerged Lands Act of 1953
and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 .68 The former granted the
individual states title to submerged lands extending three miles from their shores
64. Id. at 517-18. Florida argued that Congress had approved the maritime boundaries of
Florida which, in certain areas, included more than three miles of the Atlantic. See Act of June
25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73 (admitting the states ofNorth Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana,
Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress). As a result, Florida claimed the federal
government had thereby granted to Florida the entire seabed within those bounds. Florida
additionally contended that the Florida Straits were not in the Atlantic Ocean (as the United
States argued) but the Gulf of Mexico.
65. Maine, 420 U.S. at 519.
66. Id. at 522-23.
67. Id. 515, 523 (citing Texas, 339 U.S. at 717).
68. Id. at 524-28.
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(and so made clear by grant the superior title of the United States), the latter
reaffirmed federal control of the seabed beyond the three-mile limit.
As the Ninth Circuit reviewed the federal paramountcy doctrine, its
disposition of the villages' appeal of the district court's legal holding acquired an
inevitability. Indeed, Judge O'Scannlain restated the district court's conclusion
that,
if the states have no property rights in the OCS via the paramountcy
doctrine, afortiori, it cannot be otherwise for a tribal entity which,
even if possessed of sovereign rights, is dependent upon the United
States in the same manner as a state with regard to, inter alia,
national defense, foreign affairs, and world commerce. 69
The Secretary of Commerce naturally sought to have the paramountcy
doctrine held applicable as against native title in order to avoid litigating the
more complex questions of fact and law that usually attend native claims; this
Alexandrian doctrine would loose the Gordian knot before him. Undoubtedly,
then, he was pleased when the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had
not erred in law.
The Circuit recapitulated the district court's reasoning: (1) whereas Indian
tribes existed and governed their lands prior to the United States, the same was
true of the original states; (2) this consideration did not prevent the Supreme
Court from finding the claims of the latter to the seabed legally precluded; (3)
it could not be otherwise but that the villages' pretensions were inconsistent with
the paramount sovereignty of the federal government in the OCS.70 We shall see
that this three-step process was an egregious analytical failure that traduced the
most basic tenet of federal Indian law.
IV The Federal Paramountry Doctrine and Common Law Aboriginal Title
A. The Analogical Vice
As we consider the villages' appeal against this conclusion and the Ninth
Circuit's support of it, let us call to mind a famous obiter made by Viscount
Haldane of the Privy Council:
There is a tendency, operating at times unconsciously, to render
[aboriginal] title conceptually in terms which are appropriate only to
systems which have grown up under English law. But this tendency
69. Native Viii. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998).
70. Id. at 1094-95.
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has to be held in check closely.... A very usual form of native title
is that of a usufructuary right, which is a mere qualification of or
burden on the radical or final title of the Sovereign where that exists.
In such cases the title of the Sovereign is a pure legal estate, to which
beneficial rights may or may not be attached. But this estate is
qualified by a right of beneficial user which may not assume definite
forms analogous to estates, or may, where it has assumed these, have
derived them from the intrusion of the mere analogy of English
jurisprudence.... Abstract principles fashioned a priori are of but
little assistance, and are as often as not misleading.7
Viscount Haldane cautions against the tendency indulged in by the Eyak
district court and ultimately the Ninth Circuit. By rendering the villages'
aboriginal claims in the same terms as the states' common law claims to title, the
district court found the former as repugnant as the latter to the federal
government's paramount interest in the OCS. For both the district and Circuit
courts, such a conclusion followed "afortiorr' from the paramountcy doctrine.
The trouble with a fortiori reasoning, however, is that the validity (to say
nothing of the soundness) of an a fortiori conclusion depends on the strength of
the logical connection (i.e., the analogy) between its propositions. That logical
connection is pointedly missing in the comparative relationship between fee and
aboriginal title vis-A-vis federal paramountcy. It means little to say that because
federal paramountcy precludes state claims to title to the seabed, it must really
treat native claims so. To argue in this way is to misunderstand the fundamental
nature of aboriginal title, which, unlike fee title, is not a creature of the common
law but a possessory right recognized by it.72 To argue in this way is to fall
victim to those analogical vices against which Viscount Haldane cautioned.
To be sure, had the lower and appellate courts been more sensitive to the
nature of aboriginal title, they might have reached a different result in their
applications of the paramountcy doctrine, or at the least arrived at the same
practical conclusion without reliance on mistaken analogy.73 An aboriginal
71. See Amodu Tijani v. Southern Nigeria (Secretary), [1921] 2 App. Cas. 399, 403-04
(P.C.) (appeal taken from S.Nig.). Amodu Tiani, itself derived from American jurisprudence,
is one of the Commonwealth's foundational cases in aboriginal law.
72. See Exparte Tiger, 47 S.W. 304 (Ct. App. Ind. Terr. 1898); see supra Part I1.
73. In its recent disposition of a claim to native title to the seabed under the Native Title Act
of 1993, the High Court of Australia explained how a valid treatment of native title should
eschew such false associations:
Those [native title] rights and interests may have some or all of the features which
a common [law] lawyer might recognise as a species of property. Neither the use
of the word "title" nor the fact that the rights and interests include some rights and
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claim to title to the seabed should, like every aboriginal claim, be considered on
its own terms, even if after such consideration it isjudged to be extinguished by
sovereign command or cession.74
B. The Misconstruction of Precedent
In their appellate brief, the villages marshaled the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Village of Gambell v. Hodel, in which the Circuit stated, after clarification by
the Supreme Court, that "aboriginal rights may exist concurrently with a
paramount federal interest [in the OCS], without undermining that interest."75
In Gambell, however, only nonexclusive assertions of aboriginal subsistence
rights were considered. After making clear that these were neither precluded by
the paramountcy doctrine nor otherwise extinguished by Congress, the Ninth
Circuit remanded to the district court consideration whether, as a factual matter,
the village of Gambell and its sister appellants possessed subsistence rights in
the OCS and, if they did, whether the drilling activities undertaken by oil
companies (at the authorization of the Secretary of the Interior) interfered
"significantly" with those rights.76 Clearly, had the villages enjoyed exclusive
aboriginal rights in or title to the OCS, any interference by third parties would
have violated their interest.
Gambell thus was relevant but not controlling, at least so far as regarded the
exclusive claims to title at stake in Eyak. Unfortunately for the villages, the
Ninth Circuit found a different case more apposite: Inupiat Community of the
Arctic Slope v. United States.7 In that case, the Inupiats filed suit against the
United States to "quiet title in large portions of the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas
beyond the three-mile limit."78 More specifically, the Inupiats (1) claimed
interests in relation to land should, however, be seen as necessarily requiring
identification of the rights and interests as what the common law traditionally
recognised as items of "real property". Still less do those facts necessarily require
analysis of the content of those rights and interests according to those features
which the common law would traditionally identify as necessary or sufficient to
constitute "property."
Commonwealth v. Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1, 16 (Austl.).
74. Cf Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.R. 1010, 1081 (Can.) ("Aboriginal
title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from 'normal' proprietary
interests, such as fee simple .... The idea that aboriginal title is sui generis is the underlying
principle unifying the various dimensions of that title.").
75. 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court considered the village of
Gambell's claims in Amoco Production Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
76. Gambell, 869 F.2d at 1280.
77. 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), affld, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 184.
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absolute title in themselves to large areas of the OCS (i.e., they sought the
radical title of the sovereign rather than aboriginal title as such), (2) rejected the
notion that they had "submitted to thejurisdiction of the United States," and (3)
claimed "all the rights of self-determination and sovereignty of an independent
nation."'79
The villages distinguished Inupiat by observing quite correctly that the
district court in that case failed to consider the Inupiats' claims to aboriginal title
separately from their claims to be an "independent nation," the latter being a
patently non-justiciable question."0 Moreover, the villages noted, the Ninth
Circuit itself found it unnecessary to consider this question when it affirmed the
district court's holding: the Circuit rather confined itself to an alternative basis
for decision, namely that any aboriginal interests the Inupiat might have had in
the OCS had been extinguished by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA). This statute, however, which did extinguish terrestrial aboriginal
title, was no longer relevant for purposes of aboriginal claims to the OCS. In
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, a case subsequent to Inupiat, the
Supreme Court held that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA), whose geographical limitations mirrored ANCSA's, did not apply
beyond Alaska's limits in areas like the OCS; ANCSA therefore had the same
territorial reach."1 Incomprehensibly, none of these distinctions carried water
with the Ninth Circuit. Inupiat, the Circuit stubbornly said, made clear that
"[a]ny claim of sovereign right or title over the ocean by any party other than the
United States, including Indian tribes, is equally repugnant to the principles
established in the paramountcy cases. 8 2
As it clarified its extension of the paramountcy doctrine, the Circuit insisted
that the villages' claims did not differ from the states' in California, Louisiana,
Texas, and Maine. Indeed, it waspishly observed that "[s]imply saying that a
claim of aboriginal title is less intrusive than a claim of fee title does not make
79. Id. at 187. During the district court proceedings the Inupiat Community's leader sent
telegrams to President Reagan claiming that the presence of the U.S. government in the offshore
areas at issue constituted trespass. The President was warned that he had "three days to
evacuate the citizens of the United States." A copy of this message was also sent to the Soviet
Embassy in Washington attended by the expression of a desire to establish "detente." See
Appellees' Brief at 4 n. 1, Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 746 F.2d 570
(9th Cir. 1984) (No. 82-3678).
80. Recalling that in federal Indian law, Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations."
See supra note 20 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831)).
81. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
82. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 1998).
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it so." 3 While this is true as a logical proposition, the court did not probe the
substantive justifications for the villages' contention. The fee simple title
claimed by the states in the paramountcy cases posed a real and definite threat
to the federal government's national interests and responsibilities in respect of
the OCS (including its ability to recognize aboriginal title there). A state with
fee title to the OCS could freely alienate or otherwise dispose of its interest to
any party, including aliens and foreign nations, and would be entitled to
compensation in the event that Congress exercised its power to take the state's
interest. Moreover, the anti-commandeering principle inherent in the
Constitution would prevent the federal government from interfering with a
state's authority over its own territory and consequently limit the efficacy of
Congress and the Executive in fulfilling duties related to foreign intercourse. 4
Aboriginal title, on the other hand, poses no conflict, theoretical or in fact, with
federal paramountcy anywhere in the United States. 5 Unlike the states, the
native villages sought a declaration that both presupposed and relied on the
federal government's sovereign fee and paramountcy, for it is the first principle
of aboriginal title that the "title" itself is but a "right of occupancy" dependent
on the sovereign's estate and sufferance. 6 Consequently, the villages' claim in
Eyak was founded squarely on California, Louisiana, Texas, and Maine as well
as Johnson, its progeny, and statutes like the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25
U.S.C. § 177, which long ago deprived tribes of their ability to treat with foreign
nations or alienate or control their property contrary to Congress's will.
Notwithstanding such differences, the Circuit also failed to find meaning in
"the Native Villages' purported concession that they 'do not dispute Congress's
ultimate power to enact laws authorizing non-tribal members to fish within their
aboriginal fishing grounds.', 8 7 In this respect Texas was singled out for being
distinctively germane: in that case, we recall the Supreme Court eschewed
applying the usual real property discrimination between proprietary and
83. Id. at 1096.
84. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997).
85. Gambell, 869 F.2d at 1277 (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 233-36 (1985)). Courts outside the United States have employed similar analyzes. See,
e.g., Attorney-General v. Ngati Apa [2003] 3 N.Z.L.R. 643, 136-49 (C.A.), in which the Court
of Appeal of New Zealand applied Johnson's conceptualization to determine that Maori could
hold aboriginal title to the adjacent seabed without threatening the Crown's sovereignty.
86. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-73 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543-44 (1832).
87. Eyak, 154 F.3d at 1096.
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regulatory rights to the ocean, whose use, disposition, management, and control
rather involved "national interests" and "national responsibilities.""8
Although the Supreme Court never considered aboriginal rights in any of the
paramountcy cases, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Inupiat district court's
conclusion that Indian tribes, like states, cannot "claim rights which
are... entrusted to the one external sovereign recognized by the Constitution. 89
In this way the court disdained respecting the difference between aboriginal and
common law property concepts and deliberately confused the nature of the
villages' claim: unlike the Inupiat, the villages in Eyak neither disputed the
sovereign authority of the United States nor sought to quiet the latter's title to the
OCS; to the contrary, the villages accepted from the first that federal
paramountcy could and did co-exist with aboriginal title.9°
C. The Willful Disregard of Johnson in Favor of a New Colonial Program
Most fundamentally, then, the Ninth Circuit refused to entertain the
underlying premise of two centuries of federal Indian law, namely "that federal
sovereignty is 'subject to' the Indians' right of occupancy," unless and until
Congress extinguishes it.9' As Andrew P. Richards has noted, the court should
have employed the canonical three-step analysis delineated by the Supreme
Court in Santa Fe (and previously used by the Ninth Circuit in Gambell) to
consider (1) whether the United States had extended its sovereignty over the
area at issue; (2) if it had, whether Congress had extinguished aboriginal title
thereto by a "plain and unambiguous command"9 2 ; and (3), if Congress had not,
whether the claimed aboriginal title existed in fact.93 "By conflating the first and
second steps of the aboriginal title analysis," the Ninth Circuit "held that
88. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
89. Inupiat Cmty. of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 187 (D. Alaska
1982), aff'd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984)
90. Note as well that even in the case of internal navigable waters, the federal government
enjoys a paramount power, known as the navigation servitude, and can appropriate private
interests in water courses without being obliged to give compensation. See United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). With respect to Indian reservations in these areas, the
government's power is no less, but the rights and interests are treated more like terrestrial Indian
interests, such that they are not precluded ipso facto by the federal government's paramountcy
but are merely subject to it. See COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 29, at 506.
91. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227 (1923); cf Johnson, 21 U.S. at 586.
92. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941).
93. Id. at 345; see Richards, supra note 17, at 965.
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extending federal sovereignty over the seabed and ocean via the paramountcy
doctrine amounted to an extinguishment of offshore aboriginal title. 94
The basis for the principle of plain and unambiguous action is found in
seminal works of Anglo-American political philosophy and receives full
expression in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution, which make
political legitimacy turn on "the consent of the governed."95 When Congress
exercises its plenary power over Indian affairs, the legitimacy of its action is
questionable under any theory requiring such consent.96 The principle of plain
and unambiguous action consequently operates to ensure against the casual
extinguishment of aboriginal title even as it vindicates Congress's ultimate
power to achieve that end. Put differently, it reflects federal paramountcy as
well as the fiduciary duties governing relations between the United States and
Native Americans.
It has rightly been said that "[n]ative title involves concepts that are not
traditionally the domain of the courts, such as collective rights, legal
pluralism, and issues of competing sovereignty."9 7 In this instance the Circuit
either lost itsjuridical bearings or refused to take them: as Congress had never
addressed aboriginal title in the OCS in any way other than to affirm its
existence, and given that the United States had obviously extended its
sovereignty over the area by its offshore regulatory schemes, the villages
should have had the opportunity to prove their aboriginal title by long-term
use and occupation.98 This was not even an instance of legislative ambiguity
requiring the canons of construction, for Congress explicitly sought to
preserve tribal interests in the OCS.99 Indeed, the Savings Clause of the Outer
94. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 345.
95. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 89-90 (1980); Frederic W. Maitland, A Historical Sketch ofLiberty
and Equality, in I THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 1-161 (H.A.L.
Fisher ed., 1911). Cf. BriefofAmici Curiae Indian Law Professors in Support of Affirmance
at 6-7, Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (No. 96-1577).
96. Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 ARtZ. L. REV. 365,
374 (1989).
97. Lisa Strelein, Conceptualising Native Title, 23 SYDNEY L. REV. 95, 97 (2001).
98. See Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 345. As explained elsewhere, in the United States formal
recognition is not a prerequisite for common law aboriginal title to exist; it is rather presumed
to continue after sovereign succession in the absence of a plain act of extinguishment.
99. On the canons' usage in non-treaty contexts, see, e.g., Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564 (1908) (construing agreement liberally to recognize tribal water rights); Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912) (construing agreement and statute liberally to recognize tribal
exemptions from state taxing authority); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree
entered 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (construing executive orders liberally to recognize tribal water
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Continental Shelf Lands Act provided that the Act "shall [not] affect such
rights, if any, as may have been acquired [in the OCS] under any law of the
United States,"' '0 and the Submerged Lands Act included a similar
reservation.' Given that aboriginal title has been recognized by the United
States since Johnson, the villages' title was accordingly a right acquired in the
OCS under American law. The Magnuson Act also protected pre-existing
rights by its requirement that the Secretary of Commerce "prepare a fishery
management plan" "consistent with ... any other applicable law."'0 2 In
Parravano v. Babbit, the Ninth Circuit held that Indian fishing rights fell
within the meaning of "other applicable law" under the Magnuson Act." 3 In
the Halibut Act, Congress stipulated that the Northern Pacific Fishery
Management Council, in its allocation of fishing privileges among U.S.
fishers, shall "be fair and equitable to all such fishermen, based upon the
rights and obligations in existing Federal law ... ,."" Aboriginal rights are
of course such "rights and obligations in existing Federal law." Finally,
exclusive aboriginal rights in the OCS were also preserved in the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972,1"5 the Endangered Species Act of 1973,06
and the Convention Between United States and Other Governments
Respecting Whaling. 10 7 Congress's intentions could hardly have been plainer.
In disregard of these, the Ninth Circuit adopted an implicit balancing test
that pitted federal sovereignty against aboriginal title when as a matter of legal
principle never the twain conflict. This depleted reasoning is characteristic
of the "profound 'flattening' of federal Indian law into the broader public law"
that typifies recent developments in the field.'0° The court in Eyak treated the
rights); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975) (construing executive order and statute
liberally to recognize tribal hunting and fishing rights).
100. 43 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
101. Seeid. § 1313.
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(c)(1) (2000).
103. 70 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. 16 U.S.C. § 773(c) (2000).
105. See id. §§ 1361-1421 h (prohibiting the hunting of marine mammals with an exclusive
exemption for Indians).
106. See id. §§ 1531-44 (prohibiting the hunting of endangered species with an exclusive
exemption for Indians).
107. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
161 U.N.T.S. 72 (protecting whales with an exclusive exemption for aboriginal whaling rights).
108. Frickey, supra note 4, at 73. For an example of the "flattening" approach to indigenous
peoples in legal philosophy, see Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 52 U. TORONTO
L.J. 135 (2002) and Taking Group Rights Carefully, in LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 203 (Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 2002). To
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tribes and states as similarly situated and assumed as an analytically anterior
matter that the former could have no more powers or property rights than
states and if anything fewer. In point of fact, federal Indian law is often the
reverse: its underlying principle is that tribes enjoy all the sovereign powers
of a post-Westphalian state that have not been expressly ceded by treaty or
abrogated by Congress. Although in recent years the Supreme Court has
assumed the task of limiting tribal power over nonmembers in a way
inconsistent with its prior jurisprudence, it is traditionally true that tribes
enjoy more powers than states." 9 (To mention the most famous example, they
are not limited by the Bill of Rights.) What is more, the tribes should be
treated differently so far as their property is concerned: whereas individual
states chose through constitutional conventions to join the United States and
therefore voluntarily acquiesced in federal power over national issues (hence
the paramountcy cases), the Alaskan Natives did none of these things. They
neither signed the Constitution nor a treaty with America, nor were they
parties to the contract between Russia and the United States that transferred
sovereignty over their land to the latter.
The Ninth Circuit's refusal to follow federal Indian law's basic rule was
tantamount to a judicial extinguishment of aboriginal title, one which
jealously usurped legislative prerogative and violated the separation of powers
delineated in the U.S. Constitution."' It also endorsed the vicious
"recognition view" of sovereign succession in which pre-existing rights are
deemed extinguished by the mere assertion of sovereignty, never to be
vindicated until recognition by a formal act of state."'
Indeed, the clear implication of the Circuit's reasoning is that the villages'
title was extinguished at the moment that the Constitution, with its allocation
the extent classical liberalism coincides with this view, see CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE LIBERAL
ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND FREEDOM (2003).
109. See supra notes 3, 20; see infra note 131.
110. Congress enjoys exclusive plenary power over Indian affairs and alone has the right to
extinguish Indian title. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; Buttz v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 119
U.S. 55, 66 (1886); Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 586 (1823). Nor is Congress's intent to extinguish title to be "lightly imputed"
in view of its fiduciary obligations to Indian nations, but must rather be "plain and
unambiguous." See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346, 353 (1941).
Il1. See supra notes 7, 56. The absurdity of this idea is demonstrated by the example Kent
McNeil uses: "This would mean that failing recognition of. . . pre-existing rights or a Crown
grant or licence to continue their occupation, the inhabitants would automatically have become
trespassers in their own homes. More startling still, their personal possessions - including the
clothes on their backs - would have suddenly become Crown property!" MCNEIL, supra note
7, at 165.
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of external sovereignty to the federal government, came to apply in the Gulf
of Alaska. Certainly there was no congressional act of state (like the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act112) that did anything of the sort. By way of
contrast, when the states joined the Union, as the paramountcy cases
explained, they relinquished their external sovereignty and its incidents, like
fee title to the OCS, to the federal government. Their consent to the
constitutional order followed by the relevant acts of statehood supplied the
formal actions necessary under the doctrine of sovereign succession to modify
their pre-existing rights. Eyak, on the other hand, treated the OCS as terra
nullius and repudiated Chief Justice Marshall's classical effort to reconcile the
invidious nature of colonialism with deduced natural law property rights.' 13
Its vision of sovereign succession comes late in the day and runs counter to
what was long ago articulated by Marshall himself:
It may not be unworthy of remark, that it is very unusual, even
in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace
the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modem
usage of nations, which has become law, would be violated; that
sense ofjustice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the
whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property
should be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled: The
people change their allegiance; their relation to their ancient
sovereign is dissolved: but their relations to each other, and their
rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this be the modem rule
even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its application to the case
of an amicable cession of territory?1 4
As the political philosopher James Tully has written, "The essence of
internal colonisation . . . is the appropriation of the land, resources and
jurisdiction of the indigenous peoples, not only for the sake of resettlement
and exploitation (which is also true in external [i.e., imperial] colonisation),
but for the territorial foundation of the dominant society itself."'115 Tully made
this comment in awareness of"the intensification of the colonial appropriation
of formerly neglected or under-exploited indigenous lands and resources, on
the one hand, and the globally coordinated insubordination of indigenous
112. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
113. For this characterization of Johnson, see Frickey, supra note 6, at 385-90.
114. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 86-87 (1833).
115. The Struggles ofindigenous Peoples for and of Freedom, in POLITICAL THEORY, supra
note 6, at 39.
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peoples on the other. ' 6 The OCS is, of course, precisely the kind of
"formerly neglected or under-exploited" area to which Tully adverts." 7
The Circuit did not end its opinion there. It further rejected what it called
"the argument that the Native Villages are entitled to exclusive use of the OCS
because they have hunted and fished in the sea for thousands of years prior to
the founding of the United States.""' Sustaining it's a fortiori fallacy, the
Circuit observed that the history of the coastal states did not preserve their
claims in the paramountcy cases, and the villages could themselves find no
support in such arguments. The court once again incorrectly presumed
isometry between aboriginal title and freehold estates. Demonstrating long-
term occupation and use is a factual predicate of proving an aboriginal title not
otherwise acknowledged by Congress' 39; the title once proven, as stated time
and again, is a surviving sui generis customary interest, one that by its nature
coexists with the naked fee of the sovereign.
V. Exclusive Aboriginal Fishing Rights Absent Treaty or Statute: The
Court's Mistake of Law
In a final footnote the Ninth Circuit stated that because the villages' claims
were barred by the paramountcy doctrine, it did not consider the district court's
alternative holding that common law property precepts precluded tribes from
possessing exclusive hunting or fishing rights in navigable waters absent a treaty
or statute. In the same note, however, the Circuit observed that it had ruled on
the issue previously and held, like the district court, that "an [exclusive]
aboriginal right to fish [in navigable waters] has been recognized only in the
context of interpretation of a ratified treaty or federal statute, where courts have
held that aboriginal fishing rights were impliedly reserved to the Indians."' 120
Although this note is only dicta, it needs saying that, contrary to the Ninth
Circuit's supposition, federal Indian law and executive policy have long
recognized uncodified, exclusive aboriginal fisheries which have no analogues
at common law. 2' In Knight v. US. LandAss'n, the Supreme Court vindicated
116. Id. at 43.
117. See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 719 (1950).
118. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998).
119. In the case of submerged reservation lands beneath navigable waterways, tribes can
prove ownership to the lands by demonstrating ownership of a historical fishery, another use
of the waterways, a statutory grant, a treaty grant, or other special facts. See COHEN, 1982 ED.,
supra note 29, at 504.
120. Eyak, 154 F.3d at 1097 n.6.
121. Cf. Mark D. Walters, Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta and Exclusive Rights to
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exclusive aboriginal rights in areas below the high-water mark, when such rights
had been recognized by the prior sovereigns Spain and Mexico. 2' Similarly, in
Damon v. Hawaii, Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld
exclusive aboriginal fishing rights in the absence of a treaty or applicable statute
and despite the fact that non-aboriginals could not possess these:
The right claimed is a right within certain metes and bounds to set
apart one species of fish to the owner's sole use, or, alternatively, to
put a taboo on all fishing within the limits for certain months and to
receive from all fishermen one-third of the fish taken upon the
fishing grounds. A right of this sort is somewhat different from
those familiar to the common law, but it seems to be well known to
Hawaii, and, if it is established, there is no more theoretical difficulty
in regarding it as property and a vested right than there is regarding
any ordinary easement or profit-A-prendre as such. The plaintiffs
claim is not to be approached as if it were something anomalous or
monstrous, difficult to conceive and more difficult to admit.'23
Two years later, Justice Holmes reaffirmed Damon's holding in Carter v.
Hawaii. 24 These cases were consistent with an earlier ruling in which the Court
of Appeals of Indian Territory rejected the argument that the common law
limited the rights and supplanted the customary law of the Creek Nation:
If the Creek Nation derived its system of jurisprudence through
the common law, there would be much plausibility in this reasoning.
But they are strangers to the common law. They derive their
jurisprudence from an entirely different source, and they are as
Fisheries in the Waters of Upper Canada, 23 QUEEN'S L. J. 301 (1998). Cf also analogous
British cases: Stephens v. Snell, 3 All E.R. 622 (Ch. 1939) (holding that a several fishery
created before Magna Carta may be re-granted by the Crown after Magna Carta, despite the
public's common law right to fish); Loose v. Castleton, 41 P. & C.R. 19 (C.A. 1978) (holding
that evidence of long usage raises a presumption of a pre-Magna Carta several fishery); and the
unreported judgment of Justice Charles in the Solomon Islands case, Hanasiki v. Symes (195 1)
(holding that an indigenous group may continue to enjoy an exclusive aboriginal right to fish
when the aboriginal right was established under indigenous custom antedating the protectorate),
cited in B. Hocking, Native Land Rights Appendix 2 (1970) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Monash
University) (on file with the Monash University Library).
122. 142 U.S. 161, 187-88 (1891). Such recognition is a usual part of sovereign succession.
See supra note 56.
123. 194 U.S. 154, 158 (1904).
124. 200 U.S. 255, 256 (1906).
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unfamiliar with common-law terms and definitions as they are with
Sanskrit or Hebrew.12
5
In support of his argument Judge O'Scannlain cited two Ninth Circuit
precedents'26 and said that he was "unaware of cases to the contrary," in spite of
the inclusion of Knight, Damon, Carter, and Tiger in the villages' brief.'2 7
Case law aside, the Executive Branch also eschewed applying Anglo-
American common law precepts to preclude Alaskan Indians' aboriginal rights
in navigable waters and submerged lands. In an opinion which remains
unmodified, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior stated, "[I]n the
absence of express Federal legislation to the contrary, Indian property rights are
to be defined in terms of tribal law rather than on the basis of the common
law....""' The Solicitor in turn inferred from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Santa Fe that:
Without attempting to mark out the locality and extent of
particular Indian claims, we may note that available information
shows that the Indians clearly recognized, inter se, private and
exclusive rights to take fish in designated waters .... [U]nless the
rights which natives enjoyed from time immemorial in waters and
submerged lands of Alaska have been modified under Russian or
American sovereignty, it must be held that aboriginal rights of the
Indians continue in effect. 2
9
125. Exparte Tiger, 47 S.W. 304, 305 (Ind. Terr. 1898) (holding that the word "indict" as
used in the Creek Constitution was not to be given its common law signification of "indictment
through the interposition of a grand jury" but rather its Creek meaning of "filing a written
accusation charging a person with crime"); cf. Mullick v. Mullick, 52 I.A. 245 (P.C. 1925)
(Privy Council applying Hindu customary law rather than English common law to advise that
a Hindu idol is a juristic entity capable of suing and being sued whose interests are represented
by the person charged with being the deity's manager); Bumper Dev. Corp. Ltd. v. Comn'r of
Police, [1991] 4 All E.R. 638 (C.A.) (holding that a Hindu temple with legal personality in
Indian but not English law may nonetheless sue in an English court).
126. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090, 1097 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998).
The two Ninth Circuit cases cited were Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v. Bateman, 655
F.2d 176, 180 n. 12 (9th Cir. 1981) and Confederated Tribes of Chehalis v. Washington, 96 F.3d
334, 341 (9th Cir. 1996). The former case discussed the issue of aboriginal fishing rights in a
terse footnote and also failed to take account of the superior precedents of Damon and Knight;
the latter merely cited the footnote in Wahkiakum Band for the same proposition.
127. See Appellants' Brief at 20, 26, 31, Eyak, 154 F.3d at 1090 (No. 97-35944).
128. Aboriginal Fishing Rights in Alaska, 57 Interior Dec. 461, 465 (1942).
129. Id. at 462-63; see United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
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As noted elsewhere, Congress in its plenary capacity has also chosen to
recognize exclusive aboriginal rights in the OCS. 3'
Prior to Eyak, the bottom-line was continuity of rights and title: what had not
been taken by cession or an act of state was presumed to remain.' 31 Indeed, this
concept is as much at the heart of fishing rights guaranteed by treaty or statute
as it is those based on use and occupation. The reason this is so is because the
powers and interests of a tribe are not delegations by Congress but reservations
of tribal sovereignty not ceded to the federal government. 132 In this way all
aboriginal fishing rights, whether codified or not, are predicated on long-term
use and occupation
3
VI. The Supreme Court's Endorsement of the New Program
In the end, the Supreme Court denied the villages' petition for certiorari.' 34
Whether this was because it actually approved of the dubious legal reasoning of
the Ninth Circuit or merely its practical effect is hard to say. One could, for
instance, have concluded that federal paramountcy precluded exclusive
aboriginal title to the OCS without also concluding that it did so because it
treated common law claims to title in that way. The High Court of Australia, for
instance, analyzed and then acknowledged aboriginal title to the seabed on its
own terms even as it also held, contestably, that such title could not give rise to
an exclusive right of use and occupancy inconsistent with the principles of the
Australian common law which the majority deemed fundamental.'35
130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
131. As Felix Cohen put it in his classic formulation, "What is not expressly limited remains
within the domain of tribal sovereignty." COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 29, at 122.
132. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
133. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,574 (1823); Cramer v. United States, 261
U.S. 219, 229 (1923).
134. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
135. In Commonwealth v. Yarmirr (2001) 208 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.), the High Court vindicated
the claimants' native title (statutorily envisaged in Australia as a bundle of rights) even as it held
that such title could no longer (i.e., after the Crown became sovereign of Australia) include
exclusive occupancy, use, and possession of the ocean waters. The aboriginal title could not
yield these exclusive rights because to do so, in the majority's view, would be fundamentally
inconsistent with the common law of Australia, which includes public rights of fishing and
navigation and international commitments to innocent passage through navigable waters.
Whether or not all of these rights are equal and so fundamental as the majority suggests is
debatable, however. Justice Kirby argued in his dissent that *an exclusive title should be
recognized, but one allowing for innocent passage, which by his reckoning is more important
than the right of a public to fish that has now been generally displaced through statutory
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American lawyers know that a bedrock principle of their constitutional
scheme is the Supreme Court's emphatic duty to pronounce the law.'36 During
the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court articulated the paramountcy
doctrine to dispose of claims to the OCS by the states and federal government.
The Ninth Circuit extended that doctrine to extinguish aboriginal title to the
Alaskan offshore shelf without concerning itself about compensation or the
nonfungible role that the OCS plays in the villages' ability to exercise their
culture, a right the United States guaranteed to them when it acceded to
instruments like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'37 The
Supreme Court allowed the Circuit to do so, diluted once more the legislature's
plenary authority over Indian nations, and continued the "massive assault" it has
led against tribal sovereignty during the last twenty-five years. ' In its haste to
colonize one of America's last frontiers by dispossessing the indigenous
occupants of it, the judiciary struck at the core of aboriginal title itself, the
primordial doctrine Chief Justice Marshall created in Johnson to accommodate
American rule-of-law to the political and humanitarian quagmire of
colonialism.' It is too early to know whether Eyak was a once-off mistake
limited to a peculiar juridical space, i.e., the ocean, or the reductio ad absurdum
of a recrudescent colonialism that views aboriginal territory not recognized by
treaty or statute as terra nullius, a contemptible doctrine with no place in our
time.
With respect to the first alternative, it is worth recalling that the jurisprudence
relating to Indian reservation interests in internal navigable waters is also
strange. Briefly, in view of the public importance of navigable waterways,
ownership of land underlying them is "strongly identified with the sovereign
power of the government"'"4 and is in this way analogous to the OCS under the
licensing. It must also be noted that the New Zealand Court of Appeal recently held in a
landmark decision that several Maori tribes could pursue their claims to exclusive aboriginal
title to the foreshore and seabed at common law or before the Maori Land Court under the Te
Ture Whenua Maori Act of 1993. The Court ruled that such claims were not legally precluded
as a matter of the common law of New Zealand (in contrast to Australia) nor did they fall
outside the statutory jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court. See Attomey-General v. Ngati Apa
[20031 3 N.Z.L.R. 643; Ani Mikaere et al., Treaty of Waitangi and Maori LandLaw, N.Z. L.
REv. 447, 462-83 (2003); Richard Boast, Maori Proprietary Claims to the Foreshore and
Seabed After Ngati Apa, 21 NZU L. REV. 1 (2004).
136. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
137. See supra note 7.
138. See cases cited supra note 3; see also Singer, supra note 3, at 644; Frickey, supra note
113, at 418-39.
139. See Singer, supra note 25, at 492.
140. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S.
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paramountcy doctrine. Unlike the OCS, however, the government holds
submerged land beneath internal navigable watercourses "for the ultimate
benefit of future States," 14 ' which presumptively take title to the land on their
admission to the Union. In this scenario a tribe is "more likely to own the beds
and banks of a boundary river than of waters interior to a reservation because
boundary descriptions often explicitly refer to the midpoint of a stream,"'42 a
specificity sufficiently robust to demonstrate that Congress intended both to
include the submerged land within the tribal reservation and to defeat the future
state's title to it.' Thus the Supreme Court recently vindicated a tribe's
ownership of submerged reservation land beneath an internal navigable
waterway after construing treaty clauses, executive orders, and congressional
actions to overcome the presumption against conveyance.' Going to such
lengths is peculiar because it runs counter to the oft repeated rule that a tribal
reservation is a "reservation" of rights not ceded by a tribe (instead of the sum
of powers delegated to it by the federal government). In other words a tribe
should not need to overcome the presumption against conveyance; its plenum
of title ought to be assumed aprioristically.'
1, 5 (1997). This is in contrast to the usual law applied to surface land. See Scott v. Lattig, 227
U.S. 229, 244 (1913).
141. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926).
142. COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 29, at 504.
143. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 273 (2001) citing Alaska, 521 U.S. at 36; Utah
Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 202 (1987).
144. Idaho, 533 U.S. at 280-81. In Montana, 450 U.S. at 556, the Court held otherwise,
ostensibly because it found no intention on Congress's part to include submerged lands within
a reservation where the tribe did not depend on fishing or use of navigable water. Justice
Blackmun,joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, strongly dissented from Montana's ruling.
They observed that the majority's reasoning was factually incorrect with respect to the Crow
Tribe's subsistence habits, disregarded the canons of construction to be applied to treaties with
Indian nations, and willfully ignored an established line of cases involving claims to submerged
lands adjacent to or encompassed by Indian reservations. Id. at 569-81. The precedent to which
Justice Blackmun referred included Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Alaska
Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 79 (1918); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
145. Cohen's editors make the following remark whose inconclusiveness reflects the crux:
One theoretical explanation is that because ownership of the beds and banks of
[internal] navigable waters is a sovereign prerogative of the federal government
or the states under the Constitution, it automatically extinguished Indian title upon
incorporation of a tribe into the United States. . . . But this theory seems
inconsistent with the recognized right of either federal or state governments to
convey fee ownership of submerged lands to private persons.
COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 29, at 504 n.260.
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Still, we should not discount the pernicious nature of Eyak's holding. To the
contrary, recent caselaw even suggests that common law aboriginal title to
surface land is not doctrinally secure, a proposition that militates against
construing the OCS as a unique zone. In State v. Elliott, the Vermont Supreme
Court assumed that the aboriginal title of the Missisquoi Abenaki could be
extinguished by the "increasing weight of history," an argument never before
tolerated in America, where it was thought that aboriginal title was generally as
"sacred as the fee simple of the whites" and consequently as durable." When
the tribe appealed the Vermont Supreme Court's ruling, their petition for
certiorari was denied. The Supreme Court thus endorsed Vermont's ex silentio
reasoning and in this way tacitly agreed, in contradiction of countless prior
holdings, that "the longer tribal rights are ignored, the greater the reason for
construing the federal government's failure to protect Indian interests as an
affirmative intent to extinguish Indian title."'' 47
It is important, then, that the Ninth Circuit en banc or the Supreme Court
itself follow the traditional approach to aboriginal title and reverse Eyak141
Alternatively, Congress should avail itself of the second-best option by using its
own paramountcy to grant the villages a title to an area commensurate with their
claim. Surely this is within its power: if it could do so much for the states when
it passed the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, a fortiori it could act in the villages'
behalf. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself once said the following in a more
orthodox federal Indian law case:
We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the power to make
grants of lands below high water mark of navigable waters in any
Territory of the United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do
so in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the
improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience of
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to
146. State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993). Elliott was
persuasively criticized by Singer, supra note 25, passim. In Australia native title can be
"washed away by the tide of history." See Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v.
Victoria (2002) 194 A.L.R. 538 (Austl.).
147. Singer, supra note 25, at 482. A similar kind of reasoning may be found in a recent
Canadian case, Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [2000] 195 D.L.R. (4th) 135 (Ont. C.A.),
which demonstrated that aboriginal title and treaty rights in Canada may be defeated by judicial
discretion, despite their constitutionalization.
148. See Richards, supra note 17, at 965, 971.
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carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which
the United States hold the Territory. 
49
Such a statute could be seen to arise from Congress's fiduciary obligations to the
Indian villages rather than an endorsement of the terra nullius view of aboriginal
title, a consideration the legislative history must be sure to reflect. 5° It would
also be one of those "other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which
the United States holds the Territory" of the OCS. 15' After all, the Supreme
Court had already held more than eighty years ago that Congress acted for a
recognized public purpose when it made a reservation that included adjacent
waters and submerged land.
52
Failing to act so, Congress should at least compensate the villages for the
taking of their aboriginal title. If we assume that the villages can adduce the
necessary proof of use and occupation, it is indisputable that they enjoyed an
exclusive property right that was extinguished. (Such proof is unlikely to be
overwhelmingly problematic under the usual common law tests of "regular
use." '153) If the import of this is that the United States has no legal obligation to
offer compensation, then such reasoning relies on the dreadful ruling in Tee-Hit-
Ton, which sanctified the racist seizure of property rights.
5 4
149. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,383 (1905), citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S.
1, 48 (1894).
150. The federal government owes a fiduciary duty to the Indian nations in view of the legal
fact that they are in a state of"pupilage" to it. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1, 17 (1831); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1935) (holding federal
executive officers to a strict standard of compliance with the federal government's fiduciary duty
to the Indian nations); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942) (imposing
the same fiduciary obligations on the federal government in respect of tribes as a private trustee
has to his beneficiary); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 18-19 (1944) (finding
that a statute requiring that the United States act as a tribe's fiduciary added little to the settled
federal Indian law doctrine that this was so); COHEN, 1982 ED., supra note 29, at 220-28. Note
also that Congress may legislate to Indians' benefit without running foul of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment: "As long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the
fulfillment of Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will
not be disturbed." Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (holding such special
treatment to be political in nature rather than racial); see also Eugene Volokh, The California
Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1358-59 (1997).
151. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 647 (1970).
152. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 88 (1918).
153. See MCNEIL, supra note 7, at 202.
154. See supra note 37. In Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Reed wrote that tribal property rights should
not be understood as rights at all, but were instead revocable licenses, i.e., "permission by the
whites to occupy." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955); see also
Singer, supra note 25, at 490, 519-27. Five years before Tee-Hit-Ton, Justice Reed had refused
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As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,155
we should recall that Tee-Hit-Ton was argued in the same year and, like Brown
but to contrary effect, remains "good" law. For Tee-Hit-Ton infamously held
that Native Americans were outside the Constitution's guarantees and that,
unlike every other American citizen, were not entitled to compensation when
their property was taken by the state.'56 To put this in relief, indigenous
Alaskans' occupation of land for millennia was not subject to the same
protection as an adverse possessor who held his property openly and notoriously
for a trivial statutory period. Such were the implications of what Justice Reed
wrote when he contended, with more recourse to myth and prejudice than
history, that the United States had conquered by the sword every Native
American tribe in what is now America and by right of law owed compensation
to none' 57:
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that,
even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for
blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will
that deprived them of their land.'58
In Justice Reed's view, the Court's decision left with Congress, "where it
belongs," the moral obligation ofproviding "Indian gratuities for the termination
of Indian occupation of government-owned land rather than making
compensation for its value a rigid constitutional principle" such as whites
enjoy.'59 It is high time that this case be overturned: Tee-Hit-Ton betrays our
commitment to equal protection and due process; it violates our international
law obligations; it ignores the basis of the common law of property, namely that
to uphold Fish and Wildlife Service regulations that prevented whites from commercial fishing
inside the Karluk reservation because he thought that doing so would be "too much for the
Indians." See DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, SOLD AMERICAN: THE STORY OF ALASKAN NATIVES
AND THEIR LAND, 1867-1959, at 407 (2003).
155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For a recent, similarly odious case, see State v. Elliott, 616 A.2d
210 (Vt. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (criticized by Singer, supra note 25,passim).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
157. As Singer notes, "the only act that may constitute a conquest ofthe Tee-Hit-Ton Indians
is the Supreme Court decision itself' in view of the fact that no military action of the sort Justice
Reed envisaged ever occurred. Singer, supra note 25, at 525 (citing Nell Jessup Newton, At the
Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1244 (1980)).
158. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 289-90.
159. Id. at 291. It is worth noting that Justice Reed was the "lone holdout" in Brown and
only agreed to that case's unanimous holding after much pressure from Chief Justice Warren.
See Richard Brust, The Court Comes Together, ABA J., Apr. 2004, at 40, 43.
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occupation of land gives rise to a proprietary interest; it is out of step with other
jurisdictions that have characterized aboriginal title as proprietary in nature. 6 °
As for the Alaskan villages, compensation was something that the Ninth
Circuit never raised in Eyak. (Presumably it had no need in view of Tee-Hit-
Ton's holding.) In normative terms, however, it remains an issue demanding
political resolution. The Supreme Court held in Amoco that ANCSA did not
apply offshore, and no other law has been enacted to grant the villages a means
of statutory restitution. It is also the case that the Alaskan Indians, unlike the
fifty states, never had the opportunity to agree to the Constitution's allocation of
national external sovereignty to the federal government. The extinguishment of
their title was uncompensated and nonconsensual. 6 ' As the villages' fiduciary,
Congress should rectify this invidious state of affairs.
VII. Aboriginal Rights and Judicial Wrongs
In November 1998, following the dismissal of Eyak by the Ninth Circuit and
the Supreme Court's refusal to review it, 62 the village members filed a new
claim, Native Village of Eyak v. Evans (Evans), seeking a declaratory judgment
confirming their nonexclusive aboriginal rights in the territorial sea, an order
prohibiting the Secretary of Commerce from authorizing or permitting anyone
to interfere with those rights, and an order declaring void any commercial and
noncommercial regulations that prevented the villagers themselves from
exercising their entitlements.'63 The rationale of Evans was that Eyak applied
only to a claim of exclusive territorial title whereas previous cases, like Gambell
and Amoco, pertained to usufructs like the aboriginal right to fish instead of
160. In Canada, for instance, aboriginal title and rights are not only considered proprietary,
they are in fact the only property interests subject to constitutional protection (beyond common
law presumption, no equivalent to the Fifth Amendment exists in Canada). See Kent McNeil,
How the New Deal Became a Raw Deal for Native Americans: The Tee-Hit-Ton Alaska
Decision and the Denial of Fifth Amendment Protection to Indian Title, Remarks at the 40th
Annual Conference of the Western History Association (Oct. 11-14, 2000) (transcript on file
with author). Under New Zealand's common law aboriginal title is also protected from
uncompensated takings, and in Australia it is statutorily so. See Te Runanganui o Te Ika
Whenua Inc. Soc'y v. Attorney-General [1994] 2 N.Z.L.R. 20; Racial Discrimination Act of
1975 (Austl.).
161. See Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 545-46, 602 (1823) (holding that
aboriginal title may be acquired by the United States only through a voluntary, consensual
transfer); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515,547 (1832); Oneida Indian Nation
v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68 (1974).
162. Native Vill. ofEyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
163. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Evans, No. 98-0365 (D. Alaska Sept. 25, 2002).
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ownership as such. The district court nevertheless granted summary judgment
to the Secretary in spite of having denied his every argument. Why? Because
the villages' hunting and fishing rights were purportedly barred as a matter of
law by federal paramountcy. The district court's ruling was in direct conflict
with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gambell and the Supreme Court's in
Amoco. 64 On December 19, 2002, the villages appealed Evans to the Ninth
Circuit.
When it came time for Evans to be decided, the panel of judges recognized
the inconsistency in the Circuit's caselaw and consequently recommended that
the appeal be decided, and Eyak revisited, in an en banc hearing. The Circuit
voted to do so in April 2004,165 and, after receiving new pleadings from the
parties, convened in June. A month later it issued a terse order in favor of the
villages.16
6
The panel's order vacated the district court's ruling in Evans. It also
remanded with instructions that the district court determine the content of the
rights the villages actually have under the assumption that these have been
abrogated neither by federal paramountcy nor by other applicable law (viz.,
statutes). The en banc panel retained jurisdiction over future proceedings in
anticipation of ruling at some later date whether the villages' substantive rights
actually conflict with federal responsibilities offshore.
Unquestionably, the Ninth Circuit's order was a victory for the villages. The
fundamental hurdle opposing them, the effect of the paramountcy doctrine, did
not foreclose their claims as a legal matter. Offshore aboriginal rights may
continue to be exercised so long as they do not conflict in fact with national
external sovereignty; Gambell lives. However, the extent of the order and its
effect on Eyak remain uncertain. Indeed, Eyak was not mentioned once despite
its prominence in the parties' briefs, the brief of the amici curiae, 167 and
reasoning of the district court in Evans. In the light of this absence, one may
conclude either that territorial aboriginal title remains in conflict with federal
paramountcy or that it may, like aboriginal rights, only do so when that is proven
as a matter of fact. The better view is the latter alternative. As I have
demonstrated in this Article, aboriginal title is no more analytically repugnant
to federal paramountcy than aboriginal rights are. Indeed, the title is a species
164. See People of Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1989); Amoco Prod.
Co v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
165. Eyak Native Viii. v. Daley, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004).
166. Eyak Native Vill. v. Daley, 375 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2004).
167. See Brief of Amici Curiae Indian Law Academics in Support of Plaintiffs - Appellants,
Eyak Native Vill. v. Daley, 375 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-36155).
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of right, and its consistency with national sovereignty over land and water is
amply supported by 175 years of precedent.
In a sparsely populated area are several villages living on the water's edge.
The livelihood of their members depends as much today on the Gulf of Alaska
as it has for the last 7000 years. In the twilight of the twentieth century, Eyak
wrongly denied the villages' their opportunity to prove continued use and
occupation of parts of the OCS. It did so contrary to pronouncements by
Congress. It did so despite entrenched jurisprudence. It did so in denial of what
'" [H]umanity demands, and a wise policy requires."" 68 Allowing Eyak to stand
will perpetuate an injustice against the villages as well as other Native
Americans who rely on cardinal principles of federal Indian law for the certainty
and stability that their proprietary rights demand.' 69 Many years ago Chief
Justice Marshall articulated a doctrine that remains good law. When the en banc
panel reconvenes to evaluate the actual consistency of the villages' rights with
federal paramountcy, it should finally overturn Eyak in affirmation of the rule
that has governed every claim to aboriginal title since the Republic's founding.
168. Gambell, 869 F.2d at 1278 (citing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-
90 (1823)).
169. This is especially true for Indian nations with substantial land claims taking decades to
resolve. See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation ofN.Y. v. Viii. of Union Springs, 317 F. Supp. 2d 128
(N.D.N.Y. 2004) (motion for summaryjudgment granted following 1981 filing of suit); Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, No. 70-CV-35, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7505
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2003) (latest phase of claim dating from 1895).
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